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Introduction
Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-  Jin Wei
In less than three decades, China has grown from having a negligible role in 
world trade to being one of the world’s largest exporters, as well as a substan-
tial importer of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and other goods. This 
tremendous growth is seen by some observers as posing a threat to China’s 
trading partners.1 But because trade is a positive- sum rather than a zero- sum 
game, this growth must bring opportunities as well. For industrial countries, 
China presents the opportunity of a low- cost labor force. Whether the goods 
are simple toys sold by Mattel, or personal computers sold by Lenovo (the 
Chinese owner of what used to be IBM’s PC division), or sophisticated com-
ponents for the European Airbus, a large part of Chinese exports involves 
contracting manufacturing in China for goods that are designed elsewhere. 
This phenomenon is known as “processing trade,” and involves importing 
inputs into China, which are assembled there and then exported again. This 
role that China plays in contract manufacturing means that its own success 
is intricately tied to the fortunes of its trading partners.
Even while China acts as a manufacturing base for ﬁ  rms worldwide, its 
sheer size and rapid growth also creates challenges for many countries. On 
the export side, China is a formidable competitor in many markets, overlap-
ping in its export composition with other countries such as India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, The Philippines, and Thailand. These countries often at-
Robert C. Feenstra is a professor of economics at the University of California, Davis, and 
a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Shang-  Jin Wei is the 
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1. Even Samuelson (2002) presents a case where the United States could be harmed by 
growth in China if this growth occurs in products where the United States has a comparative 
advantage.2        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
2. The chapters by Amiti and Freund, Wang and Wei, Deng and Harrigan, Feenstra and 
Hong, and Blonigen and Ma all make use of detailed trade statistics from China Customs Sta-
tistics (various years), which include a breakdown by ordinary versus processing trade. These 
tribute declines in their own export demand to competition from China. And 
on the import side, too, China’s impact is felt worldwide. Its demand for raw 
materials, especially to fuel the investment boom of recent years (including 
the 2008 Olympics), creates market pressure and higher prices for building 
materials. Likewise, the slowdown in China’s industrial production in the 
midst of the 2008 to 2009 global crisis has contributed to a dramatic fall in 
commodity prices. The industrial production in China is also believed to 
have led to pollution in the country, which can spill over international bor-
ders, too. So the challenges created by China’s rapid growth and expanding 
trade are both domestic and international in scope. The goal of this volume 
is to investigate these issues raised by China’s growing role in world trade.
Some of the major trends in China’s exports and imports are summarized 
in tables I.1 to I.10. In table I.1, we list the nominal value (in billions of 
U.S. dollars) of exports and imports attributed to “ordinary” versus “pro-
cessing” trade, along with the share of export and import values in these 
categories. As their names suggests, ordinary trade includes imports that 
enter the country and are not destined to be incorporated into exported 
goods, or exports that did not rely speciﬁ  cally on imported inputs. Con-
versely, processing trade includes imports that enter the country duty-  free 
and will be incorporated into exported goods, and exports that rely on these 
processing imports. These two categories do not exhaust the value of trade: 
besides ordinary and processing trade, there are also international aid ﬂ  ows, 
contracting projects, goods on lease, barter trade, and other categories of 
trade ﬂ  ows. But ordinary and processing trade make up the vast majority 
of trade ﬂ  ows and together account for over 95 percent of exports and over 
80 percent of imports.
As shown in table I.1, the nominal value of exports and imports has risen 
by roughly ten times over 1992 to 2006 in both the ordinary and processing 
trade categories. That growth is especially rapid in the later years, however: 
the value of trade roughly doubled in the ﬁ  rst seven years, to 1999, and then 
grew by nearly ﬁ  ve times over the next seven years, to 2006, for a remarkable 
twenty- ﬁ  ve percent annual growth rate in the last seven years. Despite this 
very rapid growth, the share of processing trade does not change that much. 
On the export side, the share of processing trade rose from 47 percent in 1992 
to a high of 57 percent in 1999 and then fell back to 53 percent by 2006. Like-
wise, on the import side, the share of processing trade rose from 39 percent in 
1992 to a high of 49 percent in 1998 and then returned to 41 percent by 2006. 
These results show that the very rapid growth in both exports and imports is 
roughly balanced between ordinary and processing trade, and both of these 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.4        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
detailed Harmonized System (HS) trade data can be purchased by contacting George Shen, 
General Manager, China Customs Statistics (CCS) information center, Hong Kong; Tel.852 
9472 6072 /   Fax.852 2891 2963 /   georgeshenhkg@yahoo.com.
A further distinction that can be made in the trade data is between imports 
or exports made by foreign-  invested enterprises (FIEs), or those made by 
all other ﬁ  rms, including Chinese state-  owned enterprises, town and village 
collectives, and private ﬁ  rms. The FIEs enterprises include both joint ven-
tures between foreign and Chinese ﬁ  rms and, in later years, wholly-  owned 
foreign enterprises. In table I.2, we report the share of ordinary and pro-
cessing trade accounted for by FIEs and all other ﬁ  rms. For both exports and 
imports, FIEs accounted for only 5 percent of ordinary trade in 1992 and 
39 percent and 45 percent of processing exports and imports, respectively. 
So joint ventures with foreign ﬁ  rms accounted for very little of ordinary 
trade ﬂ  ows and less than half of processing trade ﬂ  ows in early years. But 
the presence of joint ventures and wholly-  owned foreign ﬁ  rms increased 
in both types of trade so that by 2006, FIEs account for 28 percent and 32 
percent of ordinary exports and imports, respectively, and 84 percent and 
85 percent of processing exports and imports, respectively. That indicates 
a very dominant presence of foreign ﬁ  rms in processing trade and a sub-
stantial presence in ordinary trade, too. The chapters by Wang and Wei and 
Table I.2  China’s exports and imports, by foreign-  invested enterprises (FIEs) and 
all other ﬁ  rms (share of total export or import value in ordinary or 
processing trade)
Export Import
Ordinary Processing Ordinary Processing
Year FIEs Other FIEs Other FIEs Other FIEs Other
1992 0.05 0.95 0.39 0.61 0.05 0.95 0.45 0.55
1993 0.09 0.91 0.48 0.52 0.06 0.94 0.53 0.47
1994 0.07 0.93 0.54 0.46 0.05 0.95 0.59 0.41
1995 0.06 0.94 0.57 0.43 0.12 0.88 0.63 0.37
1996 0.12 0.88 0.63 0.37 0.17 0.83 0.67 0.33
1997 0.13 0.87 0.64 0.36 0.22 0.78 0.68 0.32
1998 0.14 0.86 0.66 0.34 0.22 0.78 0.70 0.30
1999 0.16 0.84 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.75 0.72 0.28
2000 0.19 0.81 0.71 0.29 0.26 0.74 0.74 0.26
2001 0.22 0.78 0.72 0.28 0.27 0.73 0.75 0.25
2002 0.23 0.77 0.75 0.25 0.27 0.73 0.77 0.23
2003 0.24 0.76 0.79 0.21 0.29 0.71 0.81 0.19
2004 0.26 0.74 0.81 0.19 0.29 0.71 0.83 0.17
2005 0.27 0.73 0.83 0.17 0.29 0.71 0.84 0.16
2006 0.28 0.72 0.84 0.16 0.32 0.68 0.85 0.15
Source: China Customs Statistics (1992–2006).Introduction    5
3. The trade omitted from tables I.3 to I.10 is less than 1 percent of the total value in each 
table. Exports of antiques may be underreported to evade controls on such goods. See Fisman 
and Wei (2009) for evidence of underreporting on exports by China and other countries to the 
United States.
by Blonigen and Ma document the growth of foreign ﬁ  rms in the Chinese 
economy and their special presence in processing trade activities. The chap-
ter by Branstetter and Foley compares U.S. ﬁ  rms in China with those from 
other source countries.
A ﬁ  nal way of breaking down the trade data is by type of product. The 
most commonly used trade classiﬁ  cation today is the Harmonized System 
(HS), used by most countries. The Chinese customs authorities record both 
exports and imports at HS numbers with up to eight digits, such as “Live 
pure bred breeding horses,” HS 01011100; “Mulberry feeding silk-  worm 
cocoons,” HS 50010010; and “Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred 
years,” HS 97060000. A number of chapters in this volume make use of such 
disaggregate trade categories. To give an initial impression of the importance 
of each major type of product, in tables I.3 to I.10, we record the values and 
shares of ordinary and processing exports and imports by major industries. 
These industries are as follows:
Animals, Food—animals, vegetable products, and foodstuﬀs (HS 01–  24)
Minerals, Wood—mineral and wood products, stone and glass (HS 25–  27, 
44– 49,  68– 71)
Chemicals, Plastic—chemicals and allied industries, plastics and rubbers 
(HS 28–  40)
Textiles—textile products, with leather and fur items (HS 41–  43, 50–  63)
Footwear, Headgear—footwear and headgear articles (HS 64–  67)
Metals, Articles—base metals and articles of base metal (HS 72–  83)
Machinery, Electrical—machinery and electrical products (HS 84–  85)
Transportation—transportation equipment (HS 86–  89)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing—miscellaneous manufactured articles, 
in  cluding cameras, clocks, toys, musical instruments, and furniture (HS 
90– 92,  94– 96)
Omitted3—arms (HS 93), antiques (HS 97), special categories (HS 98–  99)
For ordinary exports in tables I.3 and I.4, the largest dollar increase in 
exports is in textiles, which increased from about $14 billion to $108 billion 
over 1992 to 2006, with most of the growth taking place subsequent to 
China’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 
2001, when the country could begin to enjoy the beneﬁ  t of the end of the 
Multiﬁ  ber Arrangement and the Agreement on Textile and Clothing. This 
is a subject studied in the chapter by Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott. By 
2006, the other largest export industries are machinery and electrical ($76 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 8        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
($40 billion), minerals and wood ($39 billion) and miscellaneous manufac-
turing ($32 billion), which includes toys. Note that Chinese food and animal 
products exports continued to grow in absolute value after its membership in 
the WTO in 2001, in spite of the fear that its agriculture could be decimated 
by foreign competition once its tariﬀ and quota protection was reduced. 
The reason behind the agricultural expansion is analyzed in the chapter by 
Huang, Liu, Martin, and Rozelle.
When measured by the share of ordinary exports, textiles has a declin-
ing share, as do the resource-  based industries of minerals and woods and 
animals and foods, despite a rising nominal value of exports in each case. 
Conversely, the greatest increase in export shares are for the machinery and 
electrical industry, which triples from 6 percent to 18 percent of exports over 
1992 to 2006; and metals and articles of metal, which doubles from 6 percent 
to 12 percent of exports over 1992 to 2004 and then rises to 16 percent by 
2006. Overall, ordinary exports are more diversiﬁ  ed across industries than 
the pattern seen in processing exports, shown in tables I.5 and I.6.
For processing exports, machinery and electrical products experienced 
phenomenal growth, from $9 to $323 billion over the period, or from 22 
percent to 63 percent of the total value. Telecommunications equipment, a 
subset of machinery and electrical products, is one example of a processing 
export that has experienced very substantial growth. Besides machinery and 
electrical, most other categories of processing exports experience a growth 
in their value of roughly ten times over the fourteen years, so their shares 
stay roughly constant. The two most signiﬁ  cant exceptions are textiles and 
footwear and headgear, whose combined exports expand from $17 billion to 
$48 billion, so their combined share falls substantially from 43 percent to 10 
percent. (In addition, miscellaneous manufacturing has a declining share.) 
While these traditional export industries still expand in dollar terms, it is 
at a rate slower than the total for processing exports and much slower than 
the more technologically advanced products in the machinery and electrical 
industry. These industry trends in processing exports are studied in the ﬁ  rst 
two chapters in the volume, by Amiti and Freund and by Wang and Wei.
Turning to ordinary imports, in tables I.7 and I.8, these show the highest 
value and growth in minerals and woods: imports of those products rise 
from $5 billion to $118 billion, and its import share more than doubles from 
16 percent to 35 percent. These imports are likely used for construction in 
China as well as intermediate inputs needed in other industries. Their rising 
value and share are indicative of the pressure exerted by China on world 
markets for such construction and investment materials. Most other cate-
gories of imports have roughly constant shares, with import values rising 
roughly six or seven times over the fourteen years.
Finally, in tables I.9 and I.10, we report the values and shares for pro-
cessing imports by major industries. Such imports are brought into the coun-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Introduction    1 5
exported. Often, the major industries of the import and export products are 
the same. So it is not surprising to see a rapid growth in the value and share 
of processing imports within the machinery and electrical industry, which 
mirrors its very rapid growth in processing exports. Conversely, textiles also 
has a falling share (though rising value), which again is similar to what we 
found for processing exports of those products. Besides those two cases, 
most other industries in table I.10 have constant or slightly declining shares. 
The exception is miscellaneous manufacturing, whose share of processing 
imports doubles from 6 percent to 12 percent. Overall, the trends we see 
in processing imports will be determined by the production of processing 
exports, and the diﬀerence between these two categories of trade indicates 
the value added in processing activities. Because processing exports rely on 
imports, the value added in this activity is less than for ordinary exports 
or domestic production. This diﬀerence in value added and in the employ-
ment created by processing versus ordinary trade is studied in the chapter 
by Feenstra and Hong.
The Microstructure of Chinese Trade
The volume begins with several chapters that take a detailed look at the 
microeconomic structure of Chinese trade, by which we mean the details 
of how China’s exports compare with other countries in terms of product 
quality and variety, ﬁ  rm ownership, contractual trade, and the impact of 
government policies.
From trade statistics, a striking feature about Chinese exports is its appar-
ent similarity to exports by the United States, Japan, and Europe, where this 
similarity appears to be increasing over time. For example, during the period 
from 1996 to 2005, the fraction of HS six- digit product lines exported (by at 
least US$1 million) by both the high- income countries and China rose from 
71.3 percent to 86.3 percent. This is a surprising ﬁ  nding because China’s fac-
tor endowments, with a vast pool of cheap labor, is not the same as those of 
the high- income countries. Both Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) document 
this apparent rise in sophistication in China’s exports. If China has truly 
managed to export higher quality products than their endowment would 
imply, this could represent competitive pressure on ﬁ  rms in the developed 
world outside traditional labor-  intensive sectors.
The ﬁ  rst chapter in the volume, by Amiti and Freund, challenges the ﬁ  nd-
ings of the existing literature on the product quality and variety of China’s 
exports. They begin by noting that while Broda and Weinstein (2006) ﬁ  nd 
that China was the largest contributor to growth in U.S. varieties, most 
of that growth was in the early (1972 to 1988) period. Furthermore, while 
Schott (2008) and Rodrik (2006) both argue that China’s exports are in high-
 quality sectors, more typical of a highly- developed country, that conclusion 16        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
4. Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) ﬁ  nd that the share of domestic value in Chinese exports is 
only on the order of 50 percent, and the share is lower in sectors that are normally labeled as so-
phisticated, such as telecommunication equipment, and in exports by foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms.
does not take into account the large amount of processing exports in sectors 
that may be labeled as high-  tech industries.
Since 1992, Amiti and Freund ﬁ  nd a substantial reallocation of China’s 
exports away from apparel, textiles, footwear, and miscellaneous manufac-
turing (including toys) and toward electrical machinery, oﬃce machines 
(which includes computers), and telecommunications. But these are pre-
cisely the sectors that rely most heavily on processing trade. The fact that 
China exports rose in these sectors means that its skill content of exports 
also rose, making it appear closer to the export structure of a highly devel-
oped country. But that eﬀect vanishes when processing trade is omitted. In 
that case, there was no change in the average skill intensity of China manu-
facturing exports. Rather, it was a rising skill intensity of processing imports 
that appears to explain the same change for processing exports, but not for 
the rest of exports. Note that processing trade is disproportionately located 
in government policy zones. The second chapter, by Wang and Wei, suggests 
that, once a separate policy zone eﬀect on export sophistication is accounted 
for, the processing trade eﬀect only shows up in the form of a high unit value 
within a product category.
Wang and Wei use more detailed micro data than that of the previous 
chapter to study the factors behind this apparent rise in sophistication. As 
suggested in the chapter by Amiti and Freund, this phenomenon could be 
nothing but a statistical mirage due to processing trade. For example, while 
both the United States and China may export notebook computers, the Chi-
nese producers may have to rely more on importing the most sophisticated 
components, such as central processing units (CPUs) made by Intel or ADM 
in the United States. In such a case, the Chinese producers could specialize 
in the unsophisticated stage of production, even though the ﬁ  nal product 
is classiﬁ  ed as sophisticated when it shows up at the customs. If one were 
able to classify a product further into its components, China and developed 
countries might be found to produce diﬀerent components. In this case, they 
would not compete directly with each other. So under this scenario, there is 
very little for the developed countries to worry about.4
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities at both the regional and cen-
tral levels have been actively promoting quality upgrades in China’s product 
structure through tax and other policy incentives. A particular manifesta-
tion of these incentives is the proliferation of economic and technological 
development zones, high- tech industrial zones, and export processing zones 
around the country. Their collective share in China’s exports rose from less 
than 6 percent in 1995 to about 25 percent by 2005. These policy incen-
tives could increase the sophistication of China’s exports, though they are Introduction    1 7
unlikely to be eﬃcient (unless learning by doing confers a signiﬁ  cant positive 
externality). If policy is the primary driver for rising sophistication (rather 
than the mismeasurement induced by processing trade), then China may 
indeed represent a more direct competition with producers in developed 
countries.
Foreign- invested ﬁ  rms in China straddle these two explanations. The share 
of China’s total exports produced by wholly foreign- owned ﬁ  rms and Sino-
  foreign joint ventures has risen steadily over time, from about 31 percent 
in 1995 to more than 58 percent by 2005. These foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms may 
choose to produce and export much more sophisticated products than would 
indigenous Chinese ﬁ  rms. In this scenario, while China- made products may 
compete with those from developed countries, the proﬁ  ts from such activities 
go to the gross national products (GNPs) of developed countries. Of course, 
the presence of foreign ﬁ  rms may help indirectly to raise the sophistication 
of Chinese exports through various spillovers to domestic ﬁ  rms. These three 
possible scenarios can reinforce each other. For example, a foreign-  invested 
ﬁ  rm may engage in processing trade while located in a high-  tech zone.
Taking into account all these possibilities, Wang and Wei report evidence 
that neither processing trade nor foreign invested ﬁ  rms play the key role in 
generating the increased overlap in the structure of exports by China and 
the high-  income countries. Instead, improvements in human capital and 
government policies in the form of tax-  favored, high-  tech zones appear to 
contribute most to the rising sophistication of China’s exports. Because 
most processing trade takes place inside an incentive zone, it is not easy to 
identify the separate roles of processing trade and government incentives 
without the kind of detailed microdata used in this chapter. By explicitly 
analyzing the independent role of government policies in the form of high-
  tech and other incentive zones, this chapter goes beyond the analysis of 
Amiti and Freund.
An analysis of unit values in trade by Wang and Wei adds further 
insights. Processing trade is positively associated with higher unit values. 
In the absence of data on value added from imported inputs versus domes-
tic inputs, it is diﬃcult to say whether processing trade has generated any 
skill upgrading for China. However, after controlling for processing trade, 
exports by foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms tend systematically to have higher unit 
values, suggesting that they produce higher-  end product varieties (beyond 
promoting processing exports). High-  tech zones and other policy zones 
set up by the government are likewise associated with higher unit values 
(beyond promoting processing trade). Therefore, both foreign-  investment 
and government-  policy zones have helped to raise product sophistication, 
but through somewhat diﬀerent channels.
For the range of export varieties, or the extensive margin of trade, Amiti 
and Freund ﬁ  nd that its growth over the 1997 to 2005 period has been sur-
prisingly modest. Depending on whether they focus on China’s exports to 18        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
the world or to the United States, and on which country’s data are used, 
they ﬁ  nd that the growth in exports due to expanding variety cannot explain 
more than one-  quarter of the overall export growth. That means that the 
remaining three-  quarters or more of the export growth over the decade is 
explained by the intensive margin, that is, rising exports in product cate-
gories that China was exporting all along. We should expect this growth in 
the intensive margin to bring a drop in prices for imports of China’s trading 
partners, which they conﬁ  rm for the United States: over 1997 to 2005, they 
ﬁ  nd that average export prices from China to the United States fell by 1.5 
percent per year, whereas prices from the rest of the world to the United 
States rose by 0.4 percent per year.
Falling prices from China is a terms- of- trade gain for the countries import-
ing these goods but poses a challenge to the other countries exporting such 
goods on international markets. The next two chapters in the volume inves-
tigate the impact that China’s growing trade has had on its trading partners 
and other exporters, both in the Asia region and beyond.
Harrigan and Deng adopt a simple version of the Ricardian model with 
stochastic technologies, due to Eaton and Kortum (2002). In that frame-
work, the market share achieved by each country in their trading partners 
will depend on that country’s size, technical capability, and transport costs 
to its partners. An improvement in China’s technical capability increases the 
market share in partner countries by an amount that is rising in its initial 
market share: China gains the most in those markets that it already serves 
most strongly. Likewise, other exporting countries lose the most in those 
market already served by China. Harrigan and Deng ﬁ  nd some support for 
this hypothesis for several of China’s neighbors—South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Japan—in their sales to China’s top twenty markets.
Harrigan and Deng further investigate how China’s exports to nearby 
versus distant markets vary with weight and transportation mode. They 
conﬁ  rm a version of the “Washington apples” hypothesis, whereby China’s 
export prices of goods net of transport costs rise to more distant markets: 
goods shipped farther are higher quality, or of higher value relative to 
weight. The mode of transport also depends on weight, and, in theory, heavy 
goods should only be sold in nearby markets and air transport only used 
for distant markets. Interestingly, they ﬁ  nd that air transport from China 
is used predominantly by private and foreign ﬁ  rms, not the state-  owned or 
collectives, and primarily for their shipments of processing exports. That 
ﬁ  nding is consistent with a high value of time being placed on processing 
trade (Harrigan 2006).
Hanson and Robertson also investigate the impact of China’s growing 
trade on other exporters and consider ten developing countries that are 
similar to China in their share of manufacturing in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and exports: Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, The Philip-Introduction    1 9
5. India to also similar to China in its manufacturing share of GDP and exports, but Hanson 
and Robertson omit that country due to its own strong growth in recent years.
6. See table I.6, column (1). This range of estimates ignores Sri Lanka, which is found to 
beneﬁ  t from China’s growth and, therefore, exports less in the counterfactual exercise where 
China’s supply capacity is held constant.
7. See table I.6, column (7).
pines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.5 They adopt the 
conventional “gravity” speciﬁ  cation of international trade ﬂ  ows, whereby 
exports in a sector depend on the range of products in that sector, produc-
tion costs, partner GDP, and the country’s distance (and, hence, trade costs) 
to its partners. As China grows, its export sales will divert demand away 
from other exporters selling to the same markets. In the gravity equation, 
this potential diversion is captured by the “supply capacity” of China, which 
in turn should reﬂ  ect the range of products it exports and its production 
costs. Hanson and Robertson consider a counterfactual exercise where the 
supply capacity for China is held constant at its 1995 estimated value and 
then project the increase in exports for the ten other developing countries 
selling to a large set of importers in 2005. That is, they are using the gravity 
equation to estimate how the exports of the ten developing countries would 
have evolved had China not grown over 1995 to 2005.
In their results, Hanson and Robertson ﬁ  nd a modest impact of China 
on the competing exporters. For all manufacturing industries, the counter-
factual diﬀerence in export demand in 2005 does not exceed 2.8 percent, 
for The Philippines, and could be as low as 0.2 percent, for Mexico.6 The 
impacts are somewhat larger when excluding all resource industries or when 
focusing on particular manufacturing industries. In the combined group of 
apparel, footwear, electronics, and toys, for example, the increase in exports 
sales for several countries (Pakistan, Poland, and Romania) is about 5 per-
cent; followed by 4 percent for Mexico; 3 percent for Turkey; and about 2 
percent for Hungary, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Thailand.7 One reason 
that these estimates are modest in size is that the counterfactual exercise 
whereby China’s supply capacity is held constant is limiting the growth in 
the range of products exported from China and limiting the change in its 
production costs. From the chapter by Amiti and Freund, we know that 
the extensive margin of China’s exports did not rise that much over 1997 to 
2005. The counterfactual exercise used by Hanson and Robertson allows for 
the intensive margin China’s export to grow in   response to higher import 
demand or lower tariﬀs, but holds constant the extensive margin of exports 
as well as production costs. But because the extensive margin did not rise 
that much over 1997 to 2005, this counterfactual still allows for substantial 
growth in Chinese exports relative to what actually happened. This helps to 
understand why the counterfactual growth in export sales by other develop-
ing countries is not that large.20        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
The Macroeconomic Implications of China’s Trade
The second set of chapters shifts the focus to the macroeconomic con-
sequences of China’s trade. There is no doubt that the boom in China’s 
exports during the past decades is large enough to have signiﬁ  cant impacts 
on its domestic employment and production, as well as on the price levels 
of its trading partners and pressure for exchange rate adjustment. The big 
macroeconomic question is the sustainability of the current international 
equilibrium, whereby China (and other countries) are ﬁ  nancing the cur-
rent account deﬁ  cits of the United States (and some other countries). In a 
series of papers, Dooley, Folkerts-  Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b,c) 
argue that China is willing to ﬁ  nance the current account deﬁ  cits of the 
United States because it generates urban employment in China. In their 
view, this system is sustainable so long as expanding exports continue to 
generate employment gains in China, and they suggest these desired gains 
are on the order of ten to twelve million persons per year, with about 30 
percent of that coming from export growth. Feenstra and Hong investigate 
whether such employment increases have actually occurred in China due to 
export growth, relying on input- output analysis to quantify the link between 
exports and employment.
Like other chapters in the volume, Feenstra and Hong make the distinc-
tion between processing and ordinary exports. Processing exports cannot 
be expected to generate the same employment gains as ordinary exports, 
particularly when we take into account the direct plus indirect use of labor 
in each industry: the indirect use comes from labor used to produce the inter-
mediate inputs used in exports. Static estimates of the employment gains 
generated from $1,000 of exports are about 0.44 person-  years for ordinary 
exports and 0.13 person- years for processing exports, for 2000. But applying 
these coeﬃcients to the very large increase in exports since 1997 vastly over-
states the actual employment gains, by an order of magnitude or more. In 
other words, the static estimates of employment gains from the input- output 
tables are unreliable as predictors of future employment growth. Feenstra 
and Hong argue this ﬁ  nding is due to technological change as well as the 
shifting composition of industries: exports have shifted toward industries 
with high labor productivity, implying lower employment gains from any 
given increase in exports.
Making corrections for the shifting composition of industries, as well as for 
technological change (proxied by the growth in wages), the predictions from 
the input-  output analysis can match the actual employment growth more 
closely. Feenstra and Hong ﬁ  nd that the predictions of Dooley, Folkerts-
  Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b,c) are quite close to what occurred in 
China: employment grew by 7.5 to 8 million per year over 1997 to 2002, 
with export growth explaining about 30 percent of that increase, and the 
other employment gains coming from nontraded goods like construction. Introduction    2 1
Surprisingly, the domestic demand for traded goods did not add anything 
to employment over this period: the increase in demand was oﬀset by pro-
ductivity growth, leading to negligible job gains from domestic demand for 
tradable. Exports grew much faster over the 2000 to 2005 period, and so did 
domestic demand, though the breakdown between nontraded and traded 
goods is not available. Feenstra concludes that exports have become increas-
ingly important in stimulating employment in China but that the same gains 
could be obtained from growth in domestic demand, especially for tradable 
goods, which has been stagnant until at least 2002.
The macroeconomic consequences of China’s growth on its second-
 largest trading partner—Japan—are the focus of the chapter by Broda and 
Weinstein. They begin with a quotation from the Ministry of Finance in 
Japan, drawn from a widely read editorial in the Financial Times, arguing 
that China and other East Asian countries bring a “deﬂ  ationary force” in 
the global economy due to their high “supply capacity.” The words used 
here mirror the discussion of China’s “supply capacity” in the chapter by 
Hanson and Robertson. But in this case the oﬃcials in Japan are not worried 
about the impact of China’s rising export sales on other exports of other 
developing countries; rather, they are concerned about the impact of low 
prices from China on Japan itself. China’s share of imports in Japan rose 
starting in 1990, and the U.S. share fell from 1998. At the same time, from 
1992 to 2002 the import price index for Japan fell. This coincidence of events 
has led oﬃcials in Japan to believe that the rising imports from China have 
contributed to deﬂ  ation.
Broda and Weinstein argue that this belief is misplaced and, in fact, that 
the fall in import prices is due more to technical issue of the construction 
of the import price index than to any deﬂ  ationary pressures from China. 
When adopting the same formula that is used for the consumer price index, 
import prices rise instead; the same is true when using superlative formulas 
(the Törnqvist or Fisher Ideal indexes) constructed over import unit values. 
Furthermore, statistical analysis shows that the unit values from China did 
not fall faster than those from countries exporting to Japan (though the 
Chinese unit values are lower). Broda and Weinstein ﬁ  nd, however, that the 
quality and variety of Chinese exports to Japan rose considerably, but even 
these eﬀects have only a very small impact on Japanese deﬂ  ation.
As China’s trade surplus exploded in recent years, the role of the Chinese 
exchange rate in generating this surplus has become an intense subject of 
debate. In particular, has China’s currency been kept artiﬁ  cially low to give 
its exporters a competitive edge? Would Chinese trade adjust in a respon-
sive way to a renminbi (RMB) appreciation? In chapter 7, Cheung, Chinn, 
and Fujii provide an analysis of these issues. Their chapter has two parts. 
First, they assess whether the Chinese real exchange rate is consistent with 
long-  run equilibrium by casting the question in a setting of a cross-  country 
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exchange rate on both a multilateral and a bilateral (i.e., vis- à- vis the United 
States) basis.
When assessing the level of real exchange rate, Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii’s 
most important claim is that there is a distinction between ﬁ  nding undervalu-
ation and proving undervaluation. In terms of point estimates, the Chinese 
currency is shown to be substantially undervalued from a variety of speciﬁ  -
cations, sometimes on the order of 50 percent. However, none of the point 
estimates is obtained with much precision. The estimates are typically within 
2 standard deviations from the regression line (conditional mean). In other 
words, despite the large value of the point estimates, one cannot reject sta-
tistically the null hypothesis that there is no undervaluation of the Chinese 
currency. This does not prove there is no undervaluation because one equally 
cannot reject statistically the hypothesis that there is a 50 percent under-
valuation. What Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii show is that, given the nature 
of the noise in the relationship between exchange rates and other variables, 
there is a considerable amount of uncertainty associated with the battery 
of statistical tools they use. Perhaps future development of statistical tools 
would allow one to make more precise statements. Frankel, in discussing this 
chapter, argues that Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii might be overly conservative 
in acknowledging a lack of precision of the estimates. If several diﬀerent 
procedures all point to the same conclusion of an RMB undervaluation, 
perhaps the uncertainty about this conclusion is smaller than each of the 
procedures taken alone.
In the second part of the chapter, Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii examine 
whether and how Chinese trade ﬂ  ows respond to its exchange rate (hold-
ing constant other determinants of trade). Economic theory would predict 
that when the RMB appreciates, Chinese exports are likely to decline, and 
its imports are likely to increase. While Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii conﬁ  rm 
the eﬀect on the exports in the data, they ﬁ  nd it diﬃcult to corroborate 
the predicted eﬀect on imports. In fact, the imports appear to decline also 
in response to an RMB appreciation. They try a number of ﬁ  xes, such as 
separating processing imports from ordinary imports and adding cumulative 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a control variable. These modiﬁ  cations 
do not change the estimated relationship on the import side. A likely remedy 
in the future is to use much more disaggregated trade data as in some of the 
other chapters in this volume.
Sectoral Issues and Trade Policies
The third set of chapters in the volume investigates various important 
sector-  level issues. It begins by examining the use of “nontraditional” trade 
protectionist tools, in particular, antidumping investigations, both against 
China and by China. This is followed by a chapter that reﬂ  ects on the coun-
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ment on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). China’s agricultural trade reform 
and rural prosperity is the subject of the third chapter, and an investigation 
into the relationship between China’s trade and the environment concludes 
this section.
On December 1, 2001, China became a full-  ﬂ  edged member of the WTO 
after an arduous fourteen- year period of negotiations with existing members 
of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade/  World Trade Organization 
(GATT/  WTO). Because of China’s size and its rising share in world trade, 
its share in international trade disputes naturally increases over time and, 
in fact, at a pace that is more than proportional to the growth of its share 
in world trade. China’s WTO membership makes many policymakers and 
economists anxious about whether the WTO’s relatively new dispute settle-
ment mechanism could be stretched beyond its capacity.
Using several newly compiled data sets, Bown provides a rich and sys-
tematic look at the incidence and characteristics of trade disputes involving 
China since its WTO membership. The discussion is placed in a comparative 
framework: how discriminatory treatment against China by other countries 
has evolved as compared to the period prior to its membership, and how 
China’s own use of antidumping measures compares to their use by other 
countries.
Bown reports a number of interesting ﬁ  ndings. Antidumping is one of 
the increasingly popular tools of protectionism used by countries around 
the world, in part because of the success of the GATT and the WTO in 
achieving negotiated reductions in tariﬀ rates. Before China acquired its 
membership in the WTO in December 2001, its exporters faced substantial 
discriminatory treatment relative to other exporting countries during 1995 
to 2001: Chinese exporters were more likely to face antidumping charges 
than exporters from most other countries, relative to the volume of their 
exports. For example, while Chinese exports accounted for only 8 percent 
of the U.S. imports, its share in U.S. antidumping investigations was 13 
percent. Similarly, while its share in the European Union’s (EU) imports 
was only 6 percent, its share in the EU antidumping investigations was 14 
percent. We do not know from the data whether Chinese exporters were 
actually dumping more that other producers. But because China was deﬁ  ned 
as a nonmarket economy, these importing countries used benchmark cost 
calculations that were biased toward ﬁ  nding dumping by Chinese produc-
ers. Partly as a result of this, antidumping cases against Chinese exporters 
were three to four times more likely to be successful than those against other 
producers. Some of the “new” countries using antidumping tools were even 
more aggressive. For example, Argentina and Brazil targeted 21 percent and 
16 percent, respectively, of all of their antidumping cases against China, 
even though China only accounted for 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, 
of their import shares.
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to 2001, one might hypothesize that China’s trading partners may strategi-
cally target antidumping cases in sectors in which China had higher tariﬀs, as 
a way to pressure China to increase the scope of its own trade liberalization. 
If this is true, it could give a relatively benign interpretation. Bown formally 
tests this hypothesis but ﬁ  nds no support in the data. In other words, it is 
unlikely that China’s trading partners employed antidumping investigations 
systematically as a tool to encourage China to undertake bigger trade liber-
alizations in the corresponding sectors.
After 2001, the year China joined the WTO, other countries appear to 
have increased their actions against Chinese exports, including the use of 
China safeguards. For example, both the United States and the EU have 
increased the share of Chinese exporters in their overall antidumping inves-
tigations against foreign producers. Antidumping, tariﬀ barriers, and other 
trade protection tools are substitutes. Because the Chinese membership in 
the WTO has placed new limitations on the use of other more traditional 
protectionist tools, and because antidumping cases against China could still 
invoke the nonmarket economy clause for the purpose of calculating export-
ers’ costs, it is perhaps not surprising to see the rise of antidumping cases 
against China. Interestingly, although Chinese textile and garment exports 
were growing at a phenomenal rate, its trading partners have not raised the 
frequency of using the antidumping tool against the Chinese in this sector. 
Part of the reason is that they could use China- speciﬁ  c “special safeguards” 
to directly impose quantitative restrictions on Chinese exports, as discussed 
in chapter 9.
Bown then turns to examining China’s own use of antidumping inves-
tigations against exporters from other countries. Ironically, China had no 
antidumping and safeguard provisions prior to the mid-  1990s. They were 
imported by China as part of “international best-  practices.” It launched 
its ﬁ  rst antidumping case in 1997 (one of the editors of this volume was a 
consultant on behalf of the Canadian and U.S. exporters involved in this 
case) and its ﬁ  rst safeguard investigation in 2002. China has since become 
one of the top ﬁ  ve users of antidumping measures in the world. Just as for 
its trading partners, the use of antidumping is a substitute for other protec-
tionist instruments for China. While its WTO accession obligations require 
it to progressively reduce tariﬀ rates across the board, antidumping appears 
increasingly more attractive to import- competing ﬁ  rms seeking government 
relief. In the data, Bown ﬁ  nds that industries that had the biggest tariﬀ 
reductions during the WTO accession are more likely to seek antidumping 
measures against foreign producers in subsequent years.
Around the time that China’s WTO membership took eﬀect, some observ-
ers were worried that China will be involved in a huge number of trade 
disputes both as a complainant (plaintiﬀ) and as a respondent (defendant). 
This could then pose the risk of overwhelming and even paralyzing the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism (as distinct from the antidumping regula-Introduction    2 5
tions). So far, this has not turned out to be case. China has not been an active 
participant in WTO litigations against other countries. Similarly, it has been 
relatively infrequently on the defensive side in WTO litigations. However, the 
United States has brought several new cases against China in 2008. It will 
be interesting to see if this signals a change in strategy in general by China’s 
trading partners. Moreover, China has signed up as an “interested third 
party” in cases involving other complainant and respondent countries. As 
of 2006, China has been very active in forty diﬀerent disputes in this indi-
rect capacity. One possible interpretation is that China is actively learning 
about the dispute settlement mechanism and preparing to become a more 
active initiator of cases against other countries (as well as a respondent in 
cases against itself). In this sense, the past may not be a reliable predictor 
of the future.
The speciﬁ  c trade policies of the textile and apparel industry are discussed 
in the chapter by Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott. Under the GATT, 
exports of textiles and apparel to developed countries were restricted under 
the MFA, renamed as the ACT under the WTO. These quotas were elimi-
nated in 2005, at which time exports from China surged. As a result, special 
“safeguard” quotas were reimposed against Chinese exports in both the 
United States and Europe. While such safeguard quotas are normally not 
permitted under the WTO, a special provision agreed to upon China’s entry 
to the WTO in 2001 allowed for their use in textiles and apparel.
Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott document the evolution of China’s 
export in textiles and apparel since before its accession to the WTO. They 
argue that China had faced quotas that were more binding than for many 
other exporters. For example, they ﬁ  nd that the “ﬁ  ll rate” in quota categories, 
which equals exports divided by the base quota, was 88 percent for China, 
similar to that in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. 
But all other countries had ﬁ  ll rates that were lower, indicating that the 
quotas were less binding. In addition, China was not eligible for any growth 
in its quotas, as most other countries enjoyed.
All that changed when China joined the WTO in 2001. Then it could 
beneﬁ  t from the phased reduction in quota levels that other exporters had 
already experienced. Phase III of the reduction in quotas occurred in 2002, 
which was the ﬁ  rst time that China was eligible for the reductions since 
joining the WTO. China’s overall textile and apparel exports increased 
by 306 percent that year, which amounted to nearly three-  quarters of the 
total export increase from all countries. By comparison, in 2005, China’s 
exports increased by 271 percent, while global exports fell slightly. In both 
years, most of the increase in Chinese exports occurred in the intensive 
margin (selling more within existing categories of goods) rather than the 
extensive margin. Furthermore, they ﬁ  nd some evidence that the increase 
in exports was accompanied by quality downgrading, as expected when 
quotas expire.26        Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei
Thus, the growth in Chinese exports really dates from 2001 and reﬂ  ects 
past treatment under the MFA and ACT that put China in a disadvantaged 
position. From this perspective, the surge in China’s textiles and apparel 
exports after the MFA/  ACT expired in 2005 was not surprising. Countries 
that were impacted most by the growth in Chinese exports in 2005 include 
those in Central America, Oceania, East Asia, and sub-  Sahara Africa. The 
largest South Asian exporters—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—were 
not impacted to the same degree. The fact that both the United States and 
Europe reimposed special safeguard quotas on Chinese exports in 2006 will 
limit its future export growth to those developed countries (while the safe-
guards are due to expire in 2008, they may be renewed up to 2013). That may 
allow other countries to reestablish their export position. But for these other 
developing countries exporting textiles and apparel, the more important 
trend for the future will be China’s shift away from labor- intensive goods and 
toward more capital and skill-  intensive industries. Already, China’s former 
production in textiles and apparel is shifting to lower-  wage countries, such 
as Vietnam, which joined the WTO in 2007. For these reasons, fears that 
China will permanently displace other exporters of textiles and apparel are 
probably misplaced.
Under its WTO accession, China had to agree to radical reductions in 
agricultural tariﬀs. As the pre- WTO tariﬀ levels were high on many products, 
most economists and other observers predicted that agriculture was going to 
be one area in which Chinese producers were not going to be competitive, so 
that rural income was going to fall and rural poverty was likely to rise after 
the accession. Fortunately for Chinese rural households, these predictions 
did not turn out to be true. In fact, agricultural growth continued, which 
poses a puzzle. Chapter 10 by Huang, Liu, Martin, and Rozelle provides an 
answer to this puzzle.
China agreed to major reductions in agricultural tariﬀs as a part of the 
conditions for gaining the WTO membership, and it followed through on 
these liberalization promises after the accession, so the phase-  in was com-
pleted by 2005 as scheduled. The key resolution to the puzzle is to recognize 
that the high preaccession tariﬀ protection was largely oﬀset by a long list of 
policy distortions such as a high agricultural tax and a low state mandatory 
procurement price that generally were unfavorable to rural households and 
agricultural production. As a result of the domestic policy distortions, the 
net rate of protection before the WTO membership was in fact negative for 
many crops. Coinciding with the WTO accession, the Chinese have under-
taken numerous domestic reforms that gradually remove these antiagricul-
tural policy distortions. The net eﬀect of trade and domestic policy reforms 
is a positive boost to many agricultural producers.
The basic tool that Huang, Liu, Martin, and Rozelle use to gauge the net 
eﬀect of policies is the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), which is based 
on a comparison between domestic prices of agricultural products and cor-Introduction    2 7
responding international prices. The NRA was negative for farmers that 
produce rice and many other import-  competing commodities until around 
1995. The NRA continued to improve even after the WTO accession. In 
addition to removing discriminatory policies against agriculture, the Chi-
nese government also invested in the development and dissemination of 
agricultural technology, which improved farmer’s productivity. Huang, Liu, 
Martin, and Rozelle give the example of investment in research and develop-
ment (R&D) for plant biotechnology; the growth of government sponsored 
R&D was 5.5 percent per year between 1995 and 2000. They report that 
China now ranks among the global leaders in agricultural biotechnology, 
with public spending in this area second only to the United States. There-
fore, in the period leading up to the WTO accession and in the period since 
the WTO membership, farmers have gained on net from the whole package 
of policy reforms and public investment more than they have lost from the 
reductions in agricultural tariﬀs.
The ﬁ  nal chapter in this section, by Dean and Lovely, deals with China’s 
environment. Here again, conventional wisdom points toward a very nega-
tive prognosis: press reports of the pollution in China and the cost to human 
health are both frequent and disheartening. Without questioning that exist-
ing pollution levels (i.e., the stock of pollution) in China are very high, Dean 
and Lovely argue that a diﬀerent picture is obtained if one focuses instead 
on the pollution intensity of industries (i.e., the ﬂ  ow of pollution) over time. 
In fact, Chinese industrial emissions of water pollution (measured by the 
chemical oxygen demand, or COD) and air pollution (measured by soot and 
dust particles) have been declining since 1995, while sulfur dioxide shows 
only a small increase. What factor can explain the decline in emissions for 
three out of these four pollutants?
Dean and Lovely use the emissions data to calculate the pollution inten-
sity of thirty-  three Chinese sectors, for 1995 and 2004. Using that informa-
tion, they can compute whether the decline in aggregate industrial emissions 
reﬂ  ects the same decline at an industry level (a “technique” eﬀect) or reﬂ  ects 
a shift toward cleaner industries (a “composition” eﬀect). They ﬁ  nd that the 
pollution intensity of production has fallen over time for all four pollut-
ants and across nearly all sectors. Thus, there is evidence in favor of a shift 
toward cleaner production techniques. That may very well reﬂ  ect the increas-
ing attention given to environmental regulation by government agencies in 
China, though these agencies are still small and underfunded compared to 
the scale of the environmental problem.
In addition, Dean and Lovely ﬁ  nd that there has been a shift toward 
cleaner industries in China. From 1995 to 2004, the water pollution inten-
sity of exports fell by 84 percent, and the drop in air pollution intensity is 
nearly as large. Most of that drop is due to the technique eﬀect rather than 
a composition eﬀect, however. By reweighting the pollution intensities using 
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exports are cleaner than ordinary exports for all four pollutants. In addi-
tion, ordinary or processing exports are cleaner than the respective imports. 
They then develop a model to assess the role that production fragmenta-
tion through processing trade plays in explaining the pollution intensity of 
Chinese trade and ﬁ  nd empirical support for the hypotheses arising from 
the model.
Foreign Investment and Trade
Foreign direct investment is another area in which there have been sub-
stantial changes in China. The country metamorphosed from being closed 
to foreign investment in the 1970s to now being the single largest developing 
country host of FDI. Foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms are an important of China’s 
trade story, accounting for more than half of its total exports and imports. 
Moreover, in recent years, China’s modest but increasing outward direct 
investment has started to attract attention and sometimes anxiety. The last 
set of chapters examines various issues with regard to FDI.
The chapter by Blonigen and Ma examines the degree to which foreign-
 invested  ﬁ  rms have spurred the growth of domestic Chinese ﬁ  rms. Do Chi-
nese ﬁ  rms catch up with foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms in terms of export volume, 
product composition, and product quality? Blonigan and Ma examine these 
questions systematically by utilizing the same detailed data at the level of 
product, region, and ﬁ  rm ownership type (as well as other dimensions).
Over the last twenty years, as the Chinese trade volume rises, the share of 
exports by state- owned ﬁ  rms has declined steadily, while the share accounted 
for by foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms has been rising steadily. Blonigen and Ma 
employ two approaches to investigate this topic for the period 1997 to 2005. 
First, within a typical six- digit product code, they ask whether Chinese ﬁ  rms 
take up an increasingly big share. Second, for a given product, they ask 
whether the quality gap between the variety produced by domestic Chinese 
ﬁ  rms and that by foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms narrows over time.
One might guess the answer to the ﬁ  rst question from the aggregate data: 
if the share in total exports by FIEs has been rising, it is also likely to be on 
an upward trend within a product code, on average. This indeed turns out to 
be true, but Blonigen and Ma do not stop here. They also ask which factors 
could either speed up or slow down the expansion of export shares by FIEs 
across products by exploring cross-  product variations in policies that may 
encourage technological transfers, and variables that may proxy the degree 
of competition between FIEs and Chinese ﬁ  rms.
The answer to the second question is “not really.” That is, there is no evi-
dence of a steady narrowing in export quality (measured by diﬀerence in 
unit values) between FIEs and domestic ﬁ  rms. By this metric, Chinese ﬁ  rms 
appear to be “falling behind” rather than “catching up” as the unit values of Introduction    2 9
their exports appear to become progressively lower relative to the unit value 
of the same product produced by FIEs.
The government policies toward FDI are not neutral across sectors. For-
eign direct investment in various sectors can be placed in three categories: 
(a) encouraged, (b) neutral, and (c) restricted. In the “encouraged” sectors, 
while there is no reduction in the quality gap between domestic and foreign 
ﬁ  rms, the share by domestic ﬁ  rms in those sectors’ total exports actually 
declined. This suggests that the sector-  biased FDI encouragement policies 
do not systematically help domestic ﬁ  rms to catch up with FIEs, at least not 
by the criteria that Blonigen and Ma use.
The chapter by Branstetter and Foley sets out to dispel four commonly 
held perceptions regarding U.S. FDI in China. The ﬁ  rst question is, is the 
U.S. FDI in China large? The answer is no. This can be understood from two 
levels. First, U.S. multinational ﬁ  rms’ investment in China is only a small 
fraction of their total overseas investment. In 2004, for example, their China 
operation’s shares in their total overseas aﬃliate sales and assets were a mere 
1.9 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. Second, U.S. FDI in China as a 
share of China’s total inward FDI is also small. In fact, the most important 
source “country” for FDI in China is Hong Kong. However, this does not 
mean that FDI is unimportant for China. As we have previously noted, 
China is among the world’s top recipient of FDI.
The second question is, is U.S. FDI in China heavily export-  oriented? 
The answer from Branstetter and Foley is no. They use data on benchmark 
surveys of U.S. multinational ﬁ  rms and compute sales to local market ver-
sus exports. They found no evidence that U.S. aﬃliates in China are more 
export-  oriented than elsewhere. The notion that U.S. ﬁ  rms invest in China 
and then sell their products back to the United States en masse does not turn 
out to be supported by a careful look at the data. Note, however, the authors 
are not rejecting the possibility that there could be a good deal of indirect 
exports by U.S. aﬃliates in China back to the United States. For example, 
U.S. aﬃliates could sell machineries and other intermediate inputs to local 
Chinese ﬁ  rms or other unaﬃliated FIEs in China, which in turn may export 
to the United States and other markets. Checking out this possibility would 
require data that go beyond what these authors have.
The third question is does investment by U.S. multinational ﬁ  rms in China 
displace their investment in the United States? The answer is again no. Bran-
stetter and Foley examine whether a U.S. ﬁ  rm’s investment in the United 
States tends to contract whenever it expands its investment in China and 
ﬁ  nd no evidence supporting this notion. In fact, ﬁ  rms that increase employ-
ment in China also appear to increase, not decrease, employment in other 
locations. This suggests that investment in China tends to be a complement 
to investment in the United States and other locations.
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in China? At a ﬁ  rst glance, the answer may be yes. By the end of 2004, 
multinational ﬁ  rms had established more than 700 R&D centers in China. 
Global companies like Microsoft make repeated statements about engaging 
world-  class research in its China-  based R&D centers. But after examining 
data on counts of patents registered in the United States by multinational 
ﬁ  rms, including those with investors who reside in China, Branstetter and 
Foley conclude that most multinational ﬁ  rms engage relatively little true 
cutting- age research in China. Even for Microsoft, China- generated patents 
accounts for only 4 percent of the stock of all its patents (though the China 
share in its ﬂ  ow of new patents may be higher and rising). As of now at least, 
most of the China- based R&D centers probably focus on customizing tech-
nologies developed elsewhere to the Chinese market.
China’s investment in resource-  rich countries in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica, and its attempt to acquire various U.S. companies, have generated atten-
tion to its overall outbound FDI. China’s newly established sovereign wealth 
fund—the China Investment Corporation—has further focused the spot-
light on its overseas investment activities. The chapter by Cheng and Ma 
provides a timely and systematic analysis of China’s outbound FDI during 
2003 to 2006. They reach a number of interesting ﬁ  ndings.
First, in spite of the international attention, China’s outbound FDI is 
quite small, accounting for less than 2 percent of global FDI ﬂ  ow in 2006. 
Second, while the attention has been focused on China’s overseas investment 
in resource sectors, business services turn out to be the biggest area of its 
investment. It is possible that overseas business services are an important 
input into the Chinese exports. The importance of business-  services invest-
ment by Chinese ﬁ  rms simply reﬂ  ects the importance of exports for the 
Chinese economy. Cheng and Ma caution, however, that the true sector 
composition of the Chinese outbound FDI may be diﬀerent from the oﬃcial 
data as a signiﬁ  cant fraction of its outbound FDI is reported to go to tax 
havens. In all likelihood, these investment projects wind up elsewhere, but 
their true destination and sector composition are not well recorded. Third, 
the destination country’s GDP (but not income), foreign reserve, and cur-
rency appreciation are all positively related to China’s FDI in that country.
Conclusions
While Chinese GDP doubles once every eight years, its exports and 
imports have been growing at an even more impressive pace, roughly dou-
bling in value once every three to four years. This poses both opportuni-
ties and challenges for China and for the rest of the world. Magazines and 
airport bookstores are ﬁ  lled with publications with sometimes outlandish 
claims about the causes and consequences of China’s growing trade in the 
world. This book, by putting together a group of prominent empirical trade 
economists, aims to clarify a number of misconceptions and enhance our 
understanding of issues related to China’s trade.Introduction    3 1
In the pages to follow, readers will ﬁ  nd detailed analyses of the micro-
structure of trade, the macroeconomic implications, sector- level issues, and 
FDI. While the topics are diverse, a common feature is a careful examination 
of microdata that is conducted under the guidance of economic theories. 
Some conventional wisdom is overturned; many new data patterns are docu-
mented. While this volume is unlikely to be the last word on China’s trade, 
it hopefully will inspire more follow-  up research and contribute to well-
  informed discussion of China’s role in world trade.
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